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he 1998 Survey of Consumer Finance data
shows that only 48.8 percent of U.S. house-
holds owned stocks, either (i) directly or (ii)
indirectly through mutual funds. In addition, there
is a close relationship between shareholding and
wealth. In 1998, 93 percent of the richest 1 per-
cent of the population owned stocks; the richest
10 percent owned 85 percent of total stocks and
mutual funds, compared with 51 percent of total
savings deposits. Meanwhile, the average stock
return is “abnormally” higher than the average
government bond return.1 In this paper, I try to
explain this shareholding puzzle—why many peo-
ple do not hold stocks given that stocks outper-
form government bonds by a large margin.
It is costly to collect and process information
about stock markets. Bertaut (1997) finds that
better-educated people are more likely to hold
stocks, even after controlling for variables such as
wealth, current income, and unemployment risk.
He interprets education as a measure of the ability
to process information about the market and
investment opportunities. However, information
costs are not the only reason for limited stock
market participation. Rather, recent research
emphasizes that people tend to hold fewer risky
assets such as stocks in their portfolio if they are
more vulnerable to income shocks. For example,
borrowing constraints (Guiso, Jappelli, and
Terlizzese, 1996), labor income risks (Vissing-
Jorgensen, 1998b), home ownership (Fratantoni,
1998), and entrepreneurial risks (Heaton and
Lucas, 2000) are found to deter stock market entry.
Moreover, these factors have smaller effects on
people who have larger wealth. Holtz-Eakin, 
Joulfaian, and Rosen (1994) find that people are
willing to take more risks if they receive a large
inheritance.
In this paper, I develop a life-cycle model to
show how market imperfections may interact with
heterogeneous wealth to generate limited stock
market participation. Many factors, such as
successful entrepreneurial effort, life-cycle
savings, precautionary savings, and inheritance,
explain wealth inequality. To keep the model man-
ageable, I focus on three key elements, namely,
different investment opportunities (stocks and
bonds), credit market imperfections, and inheri-
tance. In the model, although the stock return is
higher than the bond return, only people with
wealth over a certain threshold own stocks. This
occurs for two reasons. First, there is a fixed cost
to entering the stock market. Second, people face
a borrowing rate that is higher than the saving rate
so that they cannot arbitrage by selling bonds and
buying stocks. As a result, wealthy households
accumulate more wealth and pass on a greater
inheritance to their families than poor households
do. In the long run, wealth is unequally distributed
and wealthy households own almost all stocks.
Some other mechanisms have explained lim-
ited stock market participation. Becker (1980)
shows that the most patient agent owns all capital
in the long run. Allen and Gale (1994) argue that
the less risk-averse person is more likely to hold
stocks. Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra
(2000) stress the life-cycle pattern of shareholdings.
Asset returns and limited stock market partici-
pation are two closely related issues. However,
recent research (i.e., Constantinides, Donaldson,
and Mehra, 2000; Polkovnichenko, 2000; and
Yaron and Zhang, 2000) has had difficulty explain-
ing the two simultaneously in general equilibrium
models. Therefore, I address asset returns and lim-
ited stock market participation separately in this
paper. First, the asset return is accepted as given
when I explain why there is limited stock market
participation. Then limited stock market participa-
tion is accepted as given when I discuss its effect
on the asset return. Nevertheless, we ultimately
need to develop a general equilibrium framework
that explains both simultaneously, but this is
beyond the scope of this paper.
Limited stock market participation may have
large effects on asset prices. The risk of the stock
market return is measured by its covariance with
shareholders’ consumption growth in the standard
framework, the consumption-based Capital Asset
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Pricing Model. Mehra and Prescott (1985) calculate
this covariance using aggregate consumption data
and find that it is too small to explain the observed
equity premium unless we believe that investors
are extremely risk averse.2 This is the so-called
equity premium puzzle. In their calculation, Mehra
and Prescott assume that everyone holds stocks so
that they can use aggregate consumption instead
of shareholders’ consumption. This assumption is
inconsistent with the data because not everyone
holds stocks. Recent research finds that limited
stock market participation does help explain the
equity premium puzzle. Using the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics data, Mankiw and Zeldes (1991)
find that shareholders’ consumption is more
volatile and more positively correlated with stock
market returns than non-shareholders’ consump-
tion. Brav and Geczy (1996) and Vissing-Jorgensen
(1998a) document a similar phenomenon using
the Consumption Expenditure Survey data. In con-
trast, Guo (2000) explores the connection between
limited stock market participation and asset prices
by calibrating a heterogeneous agent model in
which only one type of agent holds stocks. Under
reasonable parameterizations, the simulated data
match the first two moments of the risk-free rate
and the stock market return.
A related issue is whether the most recent bull
market is brought about by the increase in stock
market participation. According to the Survey of
Consumer Finance data, the stock market partici-
pation rate has increased from 31.7 percent in
1989 to 48.8 percent in 1998. However, stockhold-
ings remain extremely concentrated. For example,
the wealthiest 10 percent of U.S. households
owned 85 percent of total stocks and mutual funds
in 1998, only slightly lower than the 86 percent
owned in 1989. Wolff (2000) also reports that the
participation rate drops sharply if small share-
holders are excluded. Therefore, there is little
change in the concentration of stock ownership
and the most recent bull market is unlikely to be
explained by the increase in the stock market par-
ticipation rate.3 Given that stock prices fluctuate
widely in historical data, the most recent run-up
in stock prices may be deviations from the trend.
Limited stock market participation might also
help reconcile some macroeconomic anomalies.
For example, although rich people own almost all
stocks, their consumption share is relatively small.
This explains why aggregate consumption is not
very responsive to the stock price fluctuation. How-
ever, the effects of limited stock market partici-
pation on business cycles have not been fully
explored yet. Future research along this line should
improve our understanding of the economy.
The paper is organized as follows. I first
present some stylized facts and then use an over-
lapping-generations model to help explain limited
stock market participation and wealth inequality.
In the last section I discuss the implications for
asset prices.
SOME STYLIZED FACTS
In this section, I summarize some stylized
facts about financial markets and stock market
participation.
• The stock return is persistently higher than
the risk-free rate over long horizons.
• Very wealthy households own almost all
stocks and other investment assets.
• The share of wealth held by very wealthy
households is positively correlated with
stock prices.
• The intergenerational transfer is an impor-
tant channel through which wealth
inequality is preserved over time.
Stocks Outperform Risk-Free Assets
Over Long Horizons
The stock return is much higher than the risk-
free rate. During the period 1871-1998, the real
continuously compounding stock market return
was about 7.0 percent per year and the risk-free
rate was only 2.4 percent.4 The difference is
dramatically amplified by the compounding effect.
If you invested one dollar in large company stocks
at year-end 1925, you would have had $1,370.95
by year-end 1996. On the other hand, investments
of one dollar in short-term government bonds
grew to only $13.54 over the same period (Ibbotson
Associates, 1997).
2 See Kocherlakota (1996) for a survey of recent research on this
issue.
3 Heaton and Lucas (1999) make a similar argument. They also explore
some other explanations for the most recent stock price run-up.
4 These returns were calculated from the historical data constructed
by Robert Shiller, which is available from his homepage
<http://aida.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/>. The risk-free rate may be
overestimated because it is the return on primary commercial
paper in Shiller’s data. The annual real return on treasury bills is
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Fama and French (1988), among many others,
also document a mean-reverting process in stock
prices. This is often interpreted as meaning that
stocks are not as risky in the long run as they are
in the short run. In Figure 1, I plot the annualized
equity premium over a 30-year horizon. For
example, the value corresponding to the year 1997
is the average equity premium over the period
1968-97. The equity premium over a long horizon
is always positive, even for periods that include
the 1929 stock market crash.
However, it is not my intention to advocate
stock market investing. First, Samuelson (1994),
among others, is skeptical about these finite
sample results. He argues that “if you adhere to
the dogma that stocks must beat bonds in the
long-enough run, there is no P/E level that the
market averages out to at which you will take in
sail. A Ponzi bubble is ever possible, and given
past psychologies of boom and bust, ever-higher
P/E ratios become a self-fulfilling prophecy…”
(Samuelson, 1994, p.19). Second, the stock
market could be very volatile in the short run, and
it is rational for people not to participate in stock
markets if their wealth is too little to absorb large
shocks to stock prices. Heaton and Lucas (2000)
argue that even wealthy households should hold
fewer stocks if they have significant proprietary
income.
Very Wealthy Households Own Most
Stocks
Stocks are highly concentrated in the hands of
very wealthy households. In 1998, the richest 10
percent of U.S. households owned 85 percent of
total stocks and mutual funds. They also held most
other investment assets, including financial securi-
ties, trusts, business equity, and non-home real
estate. In fact, they owned 86 percent of total
investment assets. However, they had only 44 per-
cent of the other assets, including principal
residence, deposits, life insurance, and pension
accounts. As shown in Figure 2, their shares of
stocks and mutual funds, total investment assets,
and other assets are relatively stable over the
period 1983-98.
Portfolio compositions are also quite different
between the very wealthy and the average house-
holds, as shown in Figure 3. The principal residence
is the most important asset for average U.S. house-
holds, which accounted for 65.9 percent of total
assets for the poorest 80 percent of U.S. households
in 1995. They also allocated 11.1 percent in liquid
assets, 8.5 percent in pension assets, and 12.2 per-
cent in investment assets. Conversely, the richest 1
percent put 78.5 percent of their total wealth in
investment assets, 6.4 percent in their principal resi-
dence, 7.7 percent in liquid assets, and 4.7 percent
Figure 1
Annualized Equity Premium Over a 30-Year
Horizon









SOURCE:  Shiller’s Data.  See footnote 4.
Figure 2
Assets Held by the Richest 10 Percent,
1983-1998









SOURCE:  Wolff (2000).









in pension assets. Therefore, very wealthy house-
holds have a larger share of risky assets in their
portfolios than average households do.
Wealth Distribution Over Time
Wolff (1995) finds that wealth inequality moves
closely with stock prices. His results are reproduced
in Figure 4, which plots the share of wealth held by
the richest 1 percent of U.S. households and the
detrended stock prices for the period 1922-98.
It is clear that these two variables move
together, with a correlation coefficient of about
0.61. There are two reasons. First, the wealthiest 1
percent own almost all stocks, whereas the
principle residence is the most important asset
held by the average U.S. households. Second, stock
prices are much more volatile than the prices of
other wealth components, including principle resi-
dence. Changes in the valuation of existing assets
are thus dominated by fluctuations in the stock
market (Ludvigson and Steindel, 1999).
Inheritance and Wealth Inequality
There are many factors that explain wealth
inequality, such as successful entrepreneurial
effort, life-cycle savings, precautionary savings, and
inheritance. Here, I want to stress the empirical rel-
evance of inheritance, which is a key element of
the model presented in the next section.
Inhaber and Carroll (1992) argue that
inheritance is one of the most important sources
of wealth for the richest people, while it is a minor
source of assets for most others. For example, 80
percent of the U.S. population claims never to
have inherited any assets, and only 1 percent of
the population admits to having inherited assets of
$110,000 or more (Inhaber and Carroll, 1992, p.
73). Moreover, in both 1988 and 1989, more than
one third of the 400 wealthiest Americans listed
their primary source of wealth as inheritance,
according to Forbes magazine.
Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) argue that inter-
generational transfers account for the vast majority
of aggregate U.S. capital formation. Dynan, Skinner,
and Zeldes (2000) also find that inheritance is cru-
cial in explaining the different saving pattern
between the rich and the poor.
A LIMITED STOCK MARKET 
PARTICIPATION MODEL
For simplicity, I adopt an overlapping genera-
tion model with bequest motives, which is similar
to the model studied by Galor and Zeira (1993).
While Galor and Zeira emphasized the importance
of different education opportunities in explaining
wealth inequality, I assume that households have
different investment opportunities—they can
invest in either stocks or bonds. The stock return
Figure 3
Portfolio Compositions: Top 1% Richest and
Bottom 80% Poorest
Percent
SOURCE:  Wolff (1998).
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Wealth Distribution and Detrended Stock
Prices










SOURCE:  Wolff (1995) and Wolff (2000) for wealth share;
Shiller’s data for stock prices.
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is higher than the bond return; however, there is a
fixed stock market entry cost. In the credit market,
banks accept deposits and make loans and the
household faces a borrowing rate that is higher
than the saving rate. I show that, initially, only
households with endowments over a certain
threshold find it optimal to hold stocks because of
the fixed entry cost and the wedge between the
saving rate and the borrowing rate. Moreover,
some households that initially hold stocks eventu-
ally leave the stock market because their relatively
small endowments do not allow them to leave a
large bequest. Rich households, however, always
hold stocks and accumulate wealth faster than
poor households do because they enjoy a higher
rate of return on their assets. As a result, wealth is
unequally distributed and rich people will hold all
stocks in the long run.
Model Setup
There is a continuum of households in an
economy that persists forever. At time t, each
household, say i, has a new cohort born, ht
i. The
new cohort receives a bequest, Mt
i, from a parent,
ht
i
–1, which can be invested in stocks or bonds. At
time t+1, he receives labor income, L, and the
payoff from his earlier investments.5 After leaving
bequest Mt
i
+1 to his one child, ht
i
+1, he consumes
the rest of his wealth and exits the economy.
It is costly to enforce loan contracts. Cohorts
can save or borrow only through banks, which have
the lowest enforcement costs. Banks raise money
by issuing bonds, which promise a gross rate of
return, Rb. I assume that the enforcement cost is
proportional to borrowers’ leverage ratio and a
cohort can borrow only at the rate Rb(1+D/W),
where D is his outstanding debt and W is his net
worth.6 A cohort can also invest in stocks, which
offer a higher rate of return, Rs, than bonds do.
However, there is a fixed stock market entry cost
F>0. The fixed entry cost can be interpreted as
informational costs and factors that affect stock
market participation decisions, as discussed in the
introduction.
For simplicity, I assume that the gross stock
return, Rs, and the gross bond return, Rb, are con-
stant and that Rs>Rb in the baseline model.
However, adding noise to stock returns does not
change the results in any qualitative way as long
as stocks are better investments than bonds, in the
sense that mean returns to stocks are larger than
mean returns to bonds.
Lastly, there is a progressive tax, tb, on inheri-
tance, which will be discussed in more detail in
the next section.
Maximization Problem
Since cohorts differ only in their endowments
and bequests, I ignore the superscript i and sub-
script t. Instead, I denote Mt
i, the bequests received
by a t-cohort, as M; and I denote Mt
i
+1, the bequests
left by a t-cohort, as B.
Cohorts have identical preferences, which
depend on consumption, C, and bequests, B. The
utility function is
(1) 
where a is the relative weight given to consumption.
The maximization of equation (1) is subject to
budget constraints. If a cohort decides to stay out
of stock markets and invest all his endowments in
bonds, his budget constraints are 
(2)
Otherwise, he chooses to pay the fixed entry cost
F to invest in stocks and his budget constraints
are
(3)
where D is the amount that he borrows from the
bond market and Rb[1+D/(M–F)] is the rate at
which he can borrow because his net wealth is
M–F after he pays the fixed cost.
The progressive estate tax is defined by equa-
tion (4), for which only bequests that exceed a
maximum level B – are taxed:
(4)
The maximization is done in two steps. A
cohort first maximizes his total wealth, We, which
is the sum of the payoff to the first period’s invest-
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5 Galor and Zeira (1993) show that heterogeneity in labor income
leads to wealth inequality. Here I want to stress the importance of
heterogeneity in investment opportunities on wealth distribution.
To ensure a clear demonstration, I assume that all cohorts receive
the same labor income, L. Adding Galor and Zeira’s heterogeneous
labor income should not change these results in any qualitative
way.
6 In a general equilibrium setting, Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1999) show that the cost of external funds depends negatively on
firms’ net worth relative to the gross value of capital.42 MAY/JUNE 2001
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allocate total wealth between consumption and
bequests.
Maximization of Wealth. A cohort does one
of two things: either (i) invests all his endowments
in bonds and his second period total wealth is
given by
(5) ,
or (ii) pays the fixed entry cost, F, to participate in
the stock market and his second period total wealth
is given by
(6)
Because We is a linearly increasing function of
endowments, M, in equations (5) and (6), there
exists a threshold level of endowment, 
, 
at which the cohort is indifferent to these invest-
ment strategies. Moreover, he chooses to invest in
bonds if his endowment is below M* and chooses
to invest in stocks otherwise. The total wealth, We,
is then given by equation (7), which is a monotoni-
cally increasing function of M:
(7)
Consumption and Bequests. A cohort chooses
consumption, C, and bequests, B, to maximize
equation (1), subject to the estate tax (equation (4))
and the reduced budget constraints (equation (8)):
(8) ,
where We is defined by equation (7). Clearly, there
exist We
* and We
**, such that We
*<We
**, and the
optimal after-tax bequest is as follows:
(9)
Denote We
–1 as the inverse function of We(M). It
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**). It is clear that M*** is greater
than M**.
After substituting equation (7) into equation
(9), the optimal after-tax bequest is a function of
the endowment M as in equation (10). Here we
assume that M**is greater than M* or that non-




if M* ≤ M < M**;
if M**≤ M ≤ M***; and
otherwise.
The Dynamics of Wealth
Equation (10) is a first-order difference equa-
tion of bequests. The phase diagram is plotted in




The first condition ensures at least one stable
steady state, which is the same as in Galor and Zeira
(1993). The second condition ensures that the
wealth diverges in the long run. The third condition
is required so that rich people’s wealth has a well-
defined steady state; otherwise, it goes to infinity.
These conditions hold under reasonable
parameterizations. Let us assume that there are 30
years in each period. According to Shiller’s data, Rb
is about 200 percent and Rs is about 760 percent.
The current highest marginal estate tax rate is 60
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through 3 hold for 0.78<a<0.91. If the popula-
tion grows at 2 percent per year, conditions 1
through 3 hold for 0.60<a<0.84.7
The following results are shown clearly in
Figure 5. First, cohorts with initial endowments
less than M* do not hold stocks. Second, there are
two stable steady states ML and MH. Rich house-
holds with initial endowments greater than MM
converge to MH, and the remaining poor house-
holds converge to ML. Therefore, wealth is
unequally distributed and only rich people hold
stocks in the long run. Third, reductions in the
fixed entry cost move M* toward the origin and
therefore increase stock market participation.
Due to its simplicity, the baseline model does
not provide a complete description of data. In par-
ticular, the actual wealth distribution is not bimodal,
people do move up and down the economic scale,
and wealthy households also own a significant
amount of bonds in the data. This is because ran-
dom factors are assumed away in the baseline
model. For example, entrepreneurial success or
failure can generate mobility in wealth; rich people
hold bonds to diversify risks. Incorporations of
these considerations should improve our model’s
prediction. As an example, I will show in the next
section of the article that our model can generate
a more realistic wealth distribution if stock returns
are stochastic.
Stochastic Stock Returns. For simplicity and
without loss of generality, I assume that stock
returns are random realizations of two values and
are not serially correlated. Also, the investment
decision is made before the stock return is real-
ized. Each cohort now maximizes the expected
utility in his first period and his consumption/
bequest decision is the same as in the case of cer-
tainty. If conditions 1 through 3 hold in each state,
the dynamic of bequests with stochastic stock
returns is shown in Figure 6. Note, the portfolio
decision is independent from the state because
stock returns are not serially correlated.
In the long run, the households with initial
endowments less than MM converge to ML. The
households with initial endowments greater than
MM2 converge to the MH2/MH region. The other
households’ wealth may fluctuate between MM
and MM2, depending on the realizations of the
stock return. The stochastic return model thus
generates an additional middle class who owns
7 If there is a population growth, conditions 1 through 3 become as
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Dynamics of Bequest with Uncertainty
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some stocks. Moreover, it predicts that the wealth
inequality, or the share of wealth held by the rich,
increases with stock prices, as observed in the data.
IMPLICATIONS FOR ASSET PRICES
The asset return is taken as given in the limited
stock market participation model presented in the
previous section. In this section, I discuss the
effect of limited stock market participation on the
asset return.
Agents are usually assumed to be homogeneous
in economic models for the sake of simplicity.
However, asset pricing models with homogeneous
agents do not provide a good description for the
asset return. They fail to explain why the equity
premium is so high (the equity premium puzzle)
and why the stock price is so volatile (the excess
volatility puzzle).
In modern asset pricing models, agents are
risk averse and prefer smooth consumption. The
return to an asset thus depends on how well it
can be used to smooth agents’ consumption. Intu-
itively, one dollar is more valuable in bad states
when consumption is low than one dollar in good
states when consumption is high. A stock is thus
unattractive, and shareholders demand a positive
premium to hold such a stock if its return is low
(high) when shareholders’ consumption is low
(high). Also, the more risk-averse shareholders are,
the larger the risk premium they require. It can be
shown that the equity premium is equal to gsr,s in
a frictionless economy, where g is a measure of
relative risk aversion and sr,s is the covariance
between the stock return and the shareholder’s
consumption growth. This is the so-called con-
sumption-based Capital Asset Pricing Model.
Assuming that everyone holds stocks, Mehra and
Prescott (1985) calculate this covariance using
aggregate consumption and find (i) that it is too
small to explain the observed equity premium or
(ii) that there is an equity premium puzzle.
It also can be shown that asset price Pt is
equal to the sum of the expected cash flow, Dt+i,
weighted by stochastic discount factor Rt+i or 
. 
In the homogeneous agent model, Rt+i is equal to

















where b is the time discount factor, U´ is the mar-
ginal utility, and Ct is the aggregate consumption
at time t. Variations in asset prices thus come from
two sources: shocks to the cash flow, Dt+i, and
shocks to the stochastic discount factor, Rt+i, which
in turn are caused by aggregate consumption
shocks. Shiller (1981) finds that dividends are too
smooth to explain many variations in stock prices.
Similarly, Campbell (1991) finds that most vari-
ations in stock prices come from innovations in
the stochastic discount factor. However, the aggre-
gate consumption is too smooth to generate the
volatile stochastic discount factor implied by the
financial data. This is the excess volatility puzzle.
The preference is assumed to be time separable
in the examples given above. Constantinides (1990)
shows that it is possible to use aggregate consump-
tion to generate a volatile stochastic discount factor
as well as a large and volatile equity premium in a
habit formation model, in which utility depends on
both current and past consumption. However, the
risk-free rate is very volatile in his model because it
is also priced by the same volatile stochastic dis-
count factor. This is easy to understand. Cash flows
are stochastic on stocks and are predetermined on
bonds. Given that dividends are smooth in the data,
this difference is rather small. Stocks and bonds
should thus exhibit similar properties, i.e. means
and/or variance if they are priced by the same
stochastic discount factor. However, the stock return
is much higher and much more volatile than the
bond return in the data. Therefore, stocks and bonds
are not likely to be priced by the same stochastic
discount factor. This poses a serious challenge to
the homogeneous agent model.8
Recent research by Guo (2000) suggests that
these puzzles might be related to the fact that only
a few wealthy people own almost all stocks. He
shows that a heterogeneous agent model of
limited stock market participation can replicate
these phenomena.
There are two types of agents in his model:
one is a shareholder and the other is a non-
shareholder. They both receive labor incomes, but
only the shareholder receives dividends. Labor in-
comes and dividends follow stochastic processes.
Both agents use bonds to diversify the income risk;
8 One exception is Campbell and Cochrane (1999), who avoid this
problem by choosing a particular habit form so that the risk-free
rate is constant. However, they need a very large risk-aversion to
explain the puzzles mentioned above. Therefore, they do not really
solve the equity premium puzzle.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
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for example, an agent buys (sells) bonds when his
income is above (below) the trend. However, they
can borrow from the bond market only up to a
limited amount or there are borrowing constraints.
The model is calibrated using income processes
estimated by Heaton and Lucas (1996), and the
simulated data match the mean and variance of
stock returns and bond returns under reasonable
parameterizations.
Unlike the homogeneous agent model, stocks
and bonds may be priced by different stochastic
discount factors, as in the model by Guo (2000),
because of limited stock market participation. 
In particular, while bonds are priced by the inter-
temporal marginal rate of substitution of a non-
constrained agent(s), stocks are always priced by
the shareholder’s intertemporal marginal rate of
substitution. Stocks and bonds are thus priced by
different intertemporal marginal rates of substitu-
tion when the shareholder’s borrowing constraints
are binding. The stochastic discount factor for
bonds is 




n are consumption of the share-
holder and the non-shareholder, respectively. It is
clear that the former is larger and smoother than
the latter because borrowing constraints put a
lower bound on the discount factor of bonds, but
not stocks. Therefore, in Guo’s model, the bond
return is low and smooth while the stock return is
high and volatile, as observed in the data.
Intuitively, bonds are desirable and are priced
at a premium because they can be used to
diversify income shocks. Stocks are not desirable
because they cannot be used to diversify income
shocks. The precautionary saving motive thus
lowers only the risk-free rate, but not the stock
return. This echoes Weil’s (1989) argument that
the equity premium puzzle is indeed a risk-free
rate puzzle. To see this, the equity premium in Guo
(2000) is equal to gsr,s+rs
f–min{rs
f,rn
f}, where g is
the relative risk aversion coefficient, sr,s is the
covariance between shareholder’s consumption
and the stock return, and rs
f(rn
f) is the shadow
risk-free rate of the shareholder (non-shareholder).



































in the representative agent model for two reasons.




f}, reflecting the fact that bonds
(stocks) can (cannot) be used to hedge income
shocks. This term can be interpreted as a liquidity
premium. Second, the covariance between share-
holders’ consumption and the stock return is
larger than the covariance between aggregate con-
sumption and the stock return.
CONCLUSION
The recent Survey of Consumer Finance data
show that stocks are highly concentrated in the
hands of a few wealthy people. In this paper, I
used an overlapping-generations model to help
explain this limited stock market participation and
discussed its effect on asset prices. However, other
implications, such as its effect on business cycles,
have not been fully explored yet. Future research
along this direction should improve our under-
standing of the economy.
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